Bringing Biophysical Models into the Economic Laboratory: An Experimental Analysis of Sediment Trading in Australia by Tisdell, John G.
 
 
Bringing Biophysical Models into the Economic 
Laboratory: An Experimental Analysis of Sediment 











Contributed paper prepared for presentation at the 
International Association of Agricultural Economists Conference, 






Copyright 2006 by J. Tisdell. All rights reserved. Readers may make verbatim copies of 
this document for non-commercial purposes by any means, provided that this copyright 
notice appears on all such copies.   1
BRINGING BIOPHYSICAL MODELS INTO THE ECONOMIC LABORATORY: AN 





Experimental economics has emerged and matured as a formal method for questioning 
and stress testing economic theory and assumptions concerning individual behavior. 
More recently, experimental methods have been used successfully in an economic 
laboratory to test alternative environmental policy options. The data underpinning these 
experiments is often stylized or hypothetical in nature. Ecologists and experimental 
economics have much to gain by exploring ways to underpin economic experiments with 
data generated from biophysical models in terms of external validity and salient features 
of the issue at hand. 
 
The study makes a contribution by demonstrating how underpinning experiments with 
regionally modeled biophysical data may give insights which would not necessarily arise 
from stylized data. In this study sediment data generated from an Environmental 
Management Support System (EMSS), a software model of sediment runoff in 
catchments was used to populate the player decision space. The study investigated the 
relative performance of four different instruments (closed first and second price call 
tenders, cap and trade and command and control regulation) as mechanisms for 
promoting riparian management and reducing total suspended solids exiting a catchment 
and, as traditional auction structures, logical choices for exploring the consequences of 
incorporating modeled biophysical data. 
 
The study found unexpected insights into player behavior which may not have been 
foreseen from stylized data, suggesting that further exploration of integrated biophysical 
economic experiments is warranted. 
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An important dimension of ecological economics is to develop logical linkages between 
and/or integration of ecological or biophysical models and economic models. Using 
biophysical data generated from industry standard models to determine the parameters of 
an experiment adds a level of external validity which in turn promotes adoption by key 
stakeholders of the research findings. It can also provide at times insights which may not 
arise from stylized data.  
 
There are a number of policy instruments available to achieve environmental targets. This 
paper explores the relative performance of closed call tenders, cap and trade and 
regulation, in the form of command and control, as mechanisms for achieving reductions 
in total suspended solids exiting the Somerset Stanley Catchment of Queensland 
Australia. The method used to evaluate the options integrates an Environmental 
Management Support System (EMSS), developed for modeling sediment runoff in 
catchments with an experimental economic environment designed to explore resource 
economic issues and policy options under laboratory conditions.  
 
 
The paper is organized as follows. The paper begins by outlining the basic notions 
underpinning the management of non-point pollutants such as sediment.  Advances in 
monitoring and modeling are opening opportunities to use more point source policy 
instruments. Given these advances, the paper outlines how a first and second price closed 
call tender, a cap and trade market and a regulatory system could be used to achieve 
aggregate sediment reduction targets. This is followed by an outline of the biophysical 
model used and the experimental procedures. The paper concludes with the results and 
findings arising from the experiments. 
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Issues in sediment reduction management 
 
The stochasticity and unobservability of non-point pollution, such as sediment in 
catchments, combined with spatial and temporal heterogeneity among emitters makes the 
management of such pollution difficult (Baumol and Oates, 1993; Bouzaher and Shogren, 
1997). Baumol and Oates (1975) argue that where the contributions of individual 
pollutants can be measured, emissions-based instruments, such as  cap and trade, 
tendering and regulation among others, could be effective. Limited information on the 
processes of natural variation and problems associated with monitoring and measurement 
has led to adverse selection and moral hazard problems (Braden and Segerson 1993; 
Shortle and Dunn 1986; Segerson 1988). As the science and monitoring underpinning 
biophysical models improve, traditionally considered non-point pollutants will increasing 
be able to be managed as point sources. In the meantime, in many catchments, such as the 
Minnesota River Basin, sub-catchment groups have been established with the authority to 
trade on behalf of those in their region (Fang and Easter, 2003).  
 
Following a review of point-nonpoint source pollution trading projects in Minnesota, 
Fang and Easter (2003, p.29) concluded that: 
 
 
“[s]cientific uncertainties in credit evaluation procedures have the 
potential to compromise the environmental benefits expected from 
point-nonpoint source trading projects. However, with the help of 
advanced scientific tools, properly defined trading ratios can take these 
scientific uncertainties into account and provide assurance for the 
environmental accountability of point non-point source trading.” 
 
 
Given the limitations of current biophysical modeling but with the expectation of farm 
levels models in the future, this study, in accordance with Fang and Easter (2003), 
implemented sediment trading at a sub-catchment level as a point source in order to 
demonstrate proof of concept. At a sub-catchment level it is assumed that there are 
regional groups which coordinate activities and which have the authority to trade 
sediment credits and make reduction decisions on behalf of the farmers in their sub-
catchment. Such groups are not uncommon. In Australia, for example, regional natural 
resource management groups, such as Landcare and catchment management authorities,   4
have a long history of cooperative and group representative action on behalf of 
landholders (Williams, 2004; Roberts 1995; Connell, 1994). More recently, regional 
groups have been established as part of a national action plan for salinity and water 
quality to coordinate land management actions on a regional scale (see 
www.napswq.gov.au). These groups consist of key stakeholders and regional government 
agents in each region (Natural Resource Management Ministerial Council, (NRMMC) 
2004). As mentioned, in many catchments, such as the Minnesota River Basin, sub-
catchment groups have been established with the authority to trade on behalf of those in 
their region (Fang and Easter, 2003). It is conceivable that such groups in Australia may 
also act as representative traders in the future.  
 
Policy options for controlling sediment runoff 
 
In this study four policy instruments were explored: a first and second price tender 
system, a cap and trade market, and command and control regulation as instruments often 
used in natural resource management to control pollution levels. 
 
In the tender experiments players acting as farmers made offers to a central authority to 
construct riparian buffer zones to reduce sediment loads entering a river system. A sealed 
offer procedure was used in the first and second price tender experiments. The central 
authority accepted the lowest price offer upwards until the reduction target or the 
budgetary constraint was met. In the first price tender experiments the successful sellers 
were all paid the price of the highest successful offer. In the second price tender 
successful sellers were paid the price of the first unsuccessful offer,
2 consistent with the 
notions of a second price sealed bid proposed by Vickey (1961).  
 
The cap and trade system, as the name suggests, involved a regulating authority imposing 
an upper limit on the level of total suspended solid loads exiting the system and allowing 
farmers to trade in sediment credits to achieve the cap. The notion of cap and trade 
implies that each player can potentially be a buyer or seller. In this experiment players 
                                                      
2 In an English auction, by contrast, the successful trader only has to pay the price of the next highest offer. 
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produce credits by constructing riparian buffer zones which capture more sediment than 
required. When the market price of credits is below the players’ marginal cost of 
constructing buffer zones, they are expected to enter the market and buy units rather than 
construct buffer zones. When the market price is above the marginal cost of constructing 
buffer zones, players are expected to exceed their target production level, produce credits 
and sell the additional units. 
 
The most recent and significant applications of the cap and trade approach is in the 
implementation of the Clean Air Act by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency to 
achieve its Clear Sky objective
3and the European Union greenhouse gas emissions-trade 
scheme, which expected to start in 2005 (see European Union, 2001). The Clear Air Act 1990 
introduced a cap and trade policy instrument on the electric utility industry in the US in 
order to reduce emissions (Schmalensee, et al. 1998; Fullerton and Metcalf, 2002; 
Groenenberg and Blok, 2002; Tietenberg, et al., 1999).  
 
A number of authors have explored the relative merits of a cap and trade instrument. It is 
difficult to determine the optimal policy objective using a cap and trade approach as it 
can achieve a variety of results and impose different transaction costs. A policy of cap 
and trade at a regional level might be the most appropriate direction forward. Schwarze 
and Zapfel (2000, p.1) and others have found that “provisions to assure political 
acceptance, functional interdependencies and overlapping regulation are the most 
important influences on the design of applied cap-and-trade permit programs”. Colby 
(2000) noted that cap and trade policy instruments have been applied to a number of 
environmental problems with varying success and that such mechanisms require a 
political or legal mandate to cap resource use or in this case emission of total suspended 
solids. The experimental work reported in this paper tends to confirm these theories.
4  
 
Australia is accustomed to the use of cap mechanism, such as that imposed on water 
extraction from the Murray Darling Basin, but the use of markets to effectively manage 
the cap is relatively new, but not without precedent. Where this study differs from 
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For a discussion of the relative benefits of the Clean Sky scheme see Winters (2002).
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traditional cap and trade mechanism is that instead of setting a cap on emission levels, a 
reduction cap is set and the players have to produce the reduction rather than reduce 
production to meet a specific target.  
 
A standard closed call auction structure was used in the cap and trade experiments.  There 
is a large body of divided literature comparing and debating the relative merits of call and 
double auction structures (see, for example, Davis and Holt 1993; Smith et al., 1982). A 
closed call auction structure was chosen because it is the most commonly used in natural 
resource markets in Australia. The Northern Victoria Water Exchange, for example, use 
closed call auctions to operate temporary water markets. It is assumed that when the 
participants are inexperienced, a closed call pool price auction structure minimizes the 
likelihood that ill considered offers will determine the pool price and as such adversely 
impact on the players’ income during a period when they are learning how the market 
operates. Poor outcomes may result in low market participation in latter years. 
 
 
An alternative to either a closed call tender or cap and trade is a command and control 
regulation, such as standards prescribing riparian land management or levels of pollution 
emission. While market based instruments are gaining political standing, command and 
control instruments are still used more commonly by state and federal agencies to control 
pollution emissions as a result of gaps between normative theory and positive reality 
(Keohane et al., 1998). To minimize the risk of adverse selection and moral hazard 
associated with non-point pollution emission regulation, regulation has tended to be on 
production rather than emission levels per se (see for example Helfand, 1995).  
 
Under the regulatory instrument explored in this study each landholder was required to 
construct riparian buffer zones, as emission proxies for defuse sources of pollution on 
portions of each type of riparian land which in aggregate would achieve equivalent 
emission reductions to the tender or cap and trade instruments. The requirement imposed 
on each landholder is determined by proportioning. The cost of meeting the regulation 
imposed on each landholder would therefore also be proportional to their cost of supply. 
For example, if the requirement was a reduction by 20% then each landholder would be   7
required to construct riparian buffers on 20% on each type of riparian land type on their 
property. 
 
The model  
 
To demonstrate the integration of ecological model data with experimental economic 
techniques, a simplified version of the sediment load problem was used in which the 
relative size of the revenue returned to the farmers from a first price auction compared to 
the cost of achieving a regulative instrument. In this study it was assumed that the 
government wished to reduce the tonnage of total suspended solids exiting a catchment 
by examining policy options that would promote the construction of riparian buffer 
zones. The property right in this study is sediment loads measured in tonnage/day. 
Credits are created by constructing riparian buffer zones on farms in a catchment. These 
buffer zones reduce the total load of suspended solids exiting a catchment. In some cases 
biophysical models may allow for conversion of distance of riparian buffer into total 
suspended solid loads, at least at a sub-catchment level.  
 
 In Figure 1, supply (S) reflects the combined marginal cost of sediment reduction of each 
of the sub-catchments. It is assumed that it is possible, through regional farming 
associations, to coordinate land use within a sub-catchment. Setting a reduction target Q* 
opens a number of possible policy incentives. First, the authority could establish a first 
price tendering system, resulting in a market price P*. Alternatively, the government 
could impose a regulatory requirement that each farmer establish buffer zones to capture 
Total Suspended Solids (TSS) proportional to current aggregate loads, resulting in S
1.  
Finally, the government could establish a cap on end of pipe emissions and allow trade.  
 
The cost to the authority of purchasing loads through a first price auction is the area {O, 
P*, B, Q*}. Assuming A = {O,P*,E} and X = (E,S
1,B), the merits of a regulatory 
approach over a uniform tender system depends on the relative size of A and X. If A > X 
then the payment to farmers through the first price tender is greater than the cost of 
meeting regulatory requirements. Under cap and trade the demand (Dc) images aggregate 
supply but constrained by the cap (Q*). Supply (Sc) reflects the capacity of the players to   8
produce above their cap target. A cap and trade policy and uniform tender are expected to 
be equally efficient. A second price tender, according to Vickrey (1961), will limit 
strategic behavior and produce an unbiased report of suppliers’ marginal cost of supply 
resulting in a competitive equilibrium price.  
 
To explore the relative merits of the policy instruments further, a case study of a 
catchment in South East Queensland was selected. Modeling the consequences of 
introducing riparian buffer zones was done using an Environmental Management Support 
System (EMSS) developed by research staff in the Cooperative Research Centre for 
Catchment Hydrology. 
 
The Environmental Management Support System (EMSS) 
 
The Environmental Management Support System (EMSS) estimates the storage and 
transport of daily runoff and daily pollutant loads to the receiving waters from 175 
catchments in an area of approximately 23,000 km
2 and encompasses a diversity of land 
types, land uses and climates across southeast Queensland. The model estimates are 
sensitive to changes in climate, storage operations, land-use and land management 
practices in estimating runoff and pollutant export loads. For each sub-catchment, the 
EMSS predicts a daily runoff volume and a daily load of suspended sediment, total 
phosphorous and total nitrogen. The flows and pollutant loads from each sub-catchment 
are routed through over 2000 km of stream network, down to the tidal limits in the 
estuaries. The EMSS contains a simple representation of storages and their effect on 
sediment and nutrient trapping, and water losses and diffuse management treatments and 
riparian management options are ascribed particular pollutant stripping potential that will 
reduce the original pollutant load prediction, the efficacy of which is assumed to vary 




                                                      
5 While the model has become the industry standard and adopted by many State and Federal agencies, judging the accuracy and 
efficacy of the model is beyond the scope of this study.  
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In this case study the focus was on the sediment released from the Somerset Stanley 
Catchment (see Map 1). The Somerset Stanley Catchment is the main catchment for 
Wivenhoe dam, which is the main storage for Brisbane’s water supply. Water from the 
dam is released and extracted 70 km downstream at the Mt Crosby Treatment Plant 




This catchment consists of eleven sub-catchments and in each there are opportunities to 
establish riparian buffer zones along the banks of the rivers and streams that flow through 
them. EMSS has up to five types of streams in each sub-catchment, from major rivers to 
ephemeral streams. For each there is a length of riparian land. Within EMSS it is possible 
to set a Sediment Loading Threshold Rate (SLTR) expressed as tons/km/day for each of 
the stream types in each of the sub-catchments. In this study the SLTR for the five stream 
types was set at 1, 0.8, 0.6, 0.4 and 0.2 respectively. The notion is that level 1 streams 
(large rivers) will have a higher load rate than smaller streams.  
 
Simulations in EMSS were run and data captured for each stream type in each sub-
catchment to end of catchment loads
6. EMSS has two riparian treatments levels, superior 
and standard. The modeling used superior riparian buffer management which results in a 
one-ton per km per day sediment loading rate at sill (compared to a 0.1 loading for 
standard riparian buffer management). The catchment, consisting of 11 sub-catchments is 
in the upper northern section of the Brisbane Valley. The Stanley River sub-catchment 
was seen as a major player in the system due to its size. In order to avoid confounding the 
results due to market concentration
7, the catchment was split in two and Upper Lake 
Somerset sub-catchment was combined with the Lake Somerset and surrounds sub-
catchment. Simulations were run for each type of stream in each of the 11 sub-
                                                      
6 As discussed previously, EMSS treats riparian total suspended solid loads at a block conceptual sub-catchment level. Development 
of the model to site-specific contributions is underway and expected to overcome many of the problems associated with the 
management of non-point pollution of this nature. 
 
7 In order to avoid complications arising from market thinness and power in CO2 markets highlighted by Liski (2001), larger sub-
catchments were split and given to two players.   10
catchments. The cost of riparian buffer per kilometer was assumed constant throughout 
the catchment at $A475
8. The simulated load reductions were used to estimate unique 




Three experimental sessions of ten-repeated trade rounds were conducted under first 
price and second price closed call auction structures and cap and trade. Each session used 
eleven students (player 1 to player 11), each representing one trading units for each sub-
catchment in the Somerset Stanley Catchment. 
 
The EMSS modeled estimate of the amount of total suspended solids (TSS) exiting the 
catchment is 73,000 tons per day. The experiment assumed a target reduction of 10,000 
tons per day. Appendix A.1 gives a summary of the length of streams in each sub-
catchment (for stream orders 1 to 5), sediment loads given riparian zones and linear 
models based on percentage and absolute reductions of TSS in the system for each of the 
players. A relative cap and trade policy was explored in which each player had a specific 
emission target. In this experiment each player was given a target production level to 
represent riparian buffer management and a cost structure for up to five different types of 
units representing the five different types of streams in each sub-catchment. Figure 2 
shows Player 1’s production and income table screens populated with EMSS generated 
data for sub-catchment 1 (Kilcoy Creek 1).  
 
Each session took approximately 2 hours to complete the instructions, quiz and ten-
repeated trade periods. Software and information trials were conducted during early 
2003. The six sessions were conducted during mid 2003 at the Griffith University 
Experimental Laboratory, Brisbane. The experiments used students recruited from across 
the University. The laboratory advertises across the University for students to participate. 
Advertising available sessions and student recruitment occurs through designated 
                                                      
8 Argent and Mitchell (1998) and McGuckian (1996) as reported in Cason et al. (2002) estimate the cost of installing filter/buffer 
zones at between $15 and $65 ha/yr. The median translates to an average estimate of $475 km/yr. 
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websites
9. Students registered expressions of interest and the system selected them on the 
basis of producing unique sets for each session.  
 
On arrival, students signed-in and were allocated a player number at random. Once all the 
students arrived they were directed to a set of PowerPoint instructions, which was 
followed by a quiz consisting of a set of multiple-choice questions. Successfully 
completing all the questions gave the participants their password to enter the session and 
a hotlink to the session where they logon and acquire their production characteristics
10. 
Students were paid $A10 turn-up fee and additional payments according to their ability to 
tender successfully to produce units. The environment captured the biophysical 
characteristics and in accordance with standard experiments practice stylized the situation 
into “production” and “units”. The experiments were conducted using the experimental 
software system (TESS), an experimental economics software package developed at the 
Cooperative Research Center during the last five years. As mentioned earlier, the 
experimental computer package determined the first and second price and cap and trade 
outcomes and updated players’ computer screens.  
 
Potential buyers and sellers lodged bids and asks during a prescribed time frame of 90 
seconds and after which the bids and asks were ordered and the pool price determined. 
The sell asks were ordered from the lowest to highest price and the buy bids were ordered 
from the highest to lowest price. Buy bids were filled, highest bid price downwards from 
the lowest sell ask price upwards until the market cleared. In the case of the tender only 
the government entered a buy bid. In the cap and trade the players could chose to enter a 
bid or ask according to their circumstances. In the cap and trade treatment, the package 
clears the market and determines individual production levels to ensure that individual 
targets (and associated units sold) are met. During the experiments there was no 
opportunity for the participants to communicate.  
 
 
                                                      
9 http://www.economicexperiments.com 
 
10 Copies of the instructions and quiz are available from the author.  12
Results 
 
Bringing the data into the laboratory provides an opportunity to compare the performance 
of the cap and trade market and first and second price tender systems under controlled 
conditions. Calibration of the model using the Somerset Stanley Catchment EMSS run 
data produced the supply and demand curves shown in Figure 3, given a reduction target 
of 10,000 tons per day. The following sections will discuss and compare the efficiency of 
the tenders in terms of minimizing the cost of pollution reduction, market clearing prices 
and production levels.  
 
First and second price tenders 
 
Tables 2 and 3 present the modeled cost and the round and aggregate costs arising from 
the first and second price tender sessions. The modeled cost of reducing TSS by was 
estimated to be $49.92 per ton to achieve a reduction of 10,000 tons.  
 
In the first price closed call tender sessions less quantity was offered than modeled, 
resulting is a decrease in supply and higher realized prices. Figure 4 shows the supply 
curve for session 1 and round 1 that typifies the situation. Supply has shifted to the left of 
modeled supply resulting in an increase in price from $49.92 to $80 per ton.  As a result, 
in all sessions and on average the aggregate costs were greater than the expected modeled 
cost (session 1, t = 6.979; session 2,  t = 9.362;  session 3, t = 9.514; average, t = 15.169; 
p < 0.01 in all cases), and at times up to twice the EMSS data generated cost. The 
modeled cost of $449,260 was exceeded by more than $500,000 in 17 out of the 30 
rounds across the three sessions, as shown in Table 2. Figure 5 shows graphically the first 
price closed call tender prices through time. With the exception of session 3, there was 
little sign of convergence to competitive equilibrium. Even in session 3 convergence only 
began to appear in the latter rounds 7-10, suggesting that the strategy of restricted supply 
was sustainable through time. 
 
 One possible explanation is that players took on a tactically concerted action to restrict 
supply in the hope of realizing higher prices in the inelastic section of the supply   13
function. Recent studies using experiments have shown that uniform pricing rules contrary to 
theoretical predictions, might not lead to superior market outcomes particularly in the case of 
environmental auctions (see for example Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoost 1997; Cason 
et al., 2002 and Stoneham et al., 2003). This actions of players observed in this study, 
however, was not in all the players’ best interests and neither side payments nor 
communication were possible. Yet, supply was restricted in almost all rounds and 
experimental sessions of the first price treatment. A likely cause could lie in the thinness 
of these types of markets, leading to questions for further research. In a stylized setting 
the inelastic characteristics of the supply curve, restriction of supply and resulting 
increased government cost of the tender would not have been realized. 
 
In a second price cost call tender there is no incentive to increase offer price above the 
cost of production, based on the writings of Vickrey (1961). In contrast to the first price 
closed call tender results, beyond the fifth round there was no statistical differences 
between the modeled price and that observed in the second price experimental sessions (t 
= 0.368, p > 0.05) as shown in Figure 6. Nevertheless, the associated aggregate costs in 
session 1 and averages presented in Table 3 were still higher than modeled (t = - 2.33, p < 
0.05).   
 
Cap and Trade 
 
The third experimental treatment involved the implementation of a cap and trade regime. 
The players were able to make buy or sell offers to a closed call auction. Figure 7 shows 
the estimated supply and demand curves resulting from the first experimental cap and 
trade session, with a competitive equilibrium of $49. Figure 8 shows the bids and asks 
lodged in the three cap and trade sessions. The bids and asks the three sessions showed 
signs of converge around rounds 5 and 6 with increasing variance of bids following. All 
three sessions showed signs of outlying bid strategies. In contrast, the ask prices showed 
clear convergence in the first session, which was not replicated as strongly in the second 
or third sessions.  
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Figure 9 shows the levels of price convergence in each of the cap and trade sessions. 
Sessions 2 and 3 showed strong price convergence to that modeled throughout the ten 
repeated trade periods. Session 1, while beginning with a low market price converged 
quickly towards the competitive equilibrium. Optimal and realized production levels are 
shown in Table 4. Players 2, 4,7 and 8 established riparian buffer zones and players 1, 5, 9, 
10 and 11 purchased credits to achieve the least cost production of the sediment reduction 
target. Through the repeated market experiments production in each session moved to those 
players with the lower marginal costs of production as those with higher marginal cost 
purchased credits rather than installing buffer zones. In comparison the average cost of 
reduction under the second price tender was significantly lower than the cost under the 




Figure 10 shows the regulatory supply function for each participant meeting a proportion 
reduction target. Based on the modeled data the difference between the regulatory and 
tender instruments (A-X), where A = {O,P*,E} and X = (E,S
1,B), is positive. The 
modeled cost of purchasing 10,000 tons of total suspended solids through a tender 
process {O, P*, B, Q} is A$499,260. The modeled cost to landholders, the area {S
1, O, 
Qd}, is A$359,360. The difference between a regulatory and tender system (A-X), where 
A = {O,P*,E} and X = (E,S
1,B), is therefore A$129,900. In other words, in this example, 
based on EMSS run data, the estimated cost to landholders of meeting the regulatory 
requirements is less than the cost to the authority of purchasing through either of the 
tendering processes. The difference between the cost of regulation and the tender options 
is even greater when compared on the basis of the experimental results, suggesting that 
regulation in this instance will meet the target at least cost. The choice of policy 
instrument is often not based on cost alone. It is also based on other factors, such as 
equity and the burden on responsibility to account for past land use decisions. 
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Conclusion 
 
This paper evaluated policy instruments and trading market structures for sediment runoff 
in the Brisbane catchment of Australia using an integrated experimental/biophysical 
model. The method of analysis integrated an environmental management support system 
(EMSS), developed for modeling sediment runoff in catchments with an experimental 
economic environment designed to explore resource economic issues and policy options 
under laboratory conditions. To demonstrate application, the model and experimental 
methods were applied to a case study involving the management of total suspended solids 
exiting a catchment.  
 
As a proof of concept, the integration of biophysical modeling and experimental 
economic methods is shown to produce insights beyond those achievable using more 
conventional economic analysis. It opens new doors for analyzing policy options where 
there are important behavioral, biophysical and economic linkages. In the case study it 
was found that being able to observe behavior, rather than assuming economic optimizing 
agents, allowed for more detailed analysis of the differences between cap and trade and 
uniform tendering, which in theory should be equally efficient policy instruments. Cap 
and trade was found to be superior to the uniform tendering system. 
 
The modeling found that (a) the cost of meeting the regulatory requirement is less than 
either a first or second price auction, (b) in a first price closed call tender sessions there 
was evidence of strategic behavior to restrict supply and produce above competitive 
prices and relatively low rates of convergence, (c) in the second price closed call tender 
sessions, while the aggregate cost was greater than modeled, prices converged to the 
equilibrium after 5 periods and (d) the cap and trade produced high levels of convergence 
and production, which moved towards minimizing the cost of achieving the cap reduction 
level. Based on EMSS run data, the estimated cost to landholders of meeting the 
regulatory requirements is less than the cost to the authority of purchasing through either 
of the tendering processes.  
   16
The policy implications of these findings are dependent on the integrated use of 
ecological and economic modeling under laboratory conditions, the results of which may 
not have been as transparent using stylized data. The results suggest that further applied 
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Figure 2. Cap and Trade experiment: Player 1 Screen 
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Figure 8. Bids and asks in cap and trade experiment 
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Table 1. Player Characteristics 
 
      Unit 1  Unit 2  Unit 3  Unit 4  Unit 5  Total  Target 
Player 1  Cost  49.93  53.29 57.14 0.00 0.00      
 Units  373.00  211.00 237.00 0.00 0.00 821  594
Player 2  Cost  44.98  46.75 49.00 53.01 0.00      
 Units  662.00  119.00 184.00 187.00 0.00 1152  834
Player 3  Cost  49.48  52.78 56.55 0.00 0.00      
   Units  378.00  138.00 255.00 0.00 0.00 771  558
Player 4  Cost  19.01  20.11 21.57 24.58 32.97      
   Units  2111.00  1021.00 911.00 216.00 216.00 4475  3238
Player 5  Cost  64.27  67.66 71.75 78.87 0.00      
   Units  120.00  181.00 46.00 45.00 0.00 392  284
Player 6  Cost  46.96  49.92 53.28 68.30 0.00      
   Units  51.00  24.00 1.00 67.00 0.00 143  103
Player 7  Cost  38.49  40.45 42.87 0.00 0.00      
   Units  575.00  364.00 188.00 0.00 0.00 1127  815
Player 8  Cost  19.01  20.11 0.00 0.00 0.00      
   Units  2111.00  1021.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3132  2266
Player 9  Cost  91.31  94.27 105.81 102.82 116.35      
   Units  328.00  184.00 66.00 0.00 87.00 665  481
Player 10  Cost  97.65  134.19 0.00 0.00 0.00      
   Units  16.00  14.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 30  22
Player 11  Cost  49.65  51.55 53.89 58.31 67.38      
   Units  541.00  277.00 207.00 87.00 1.00 1113  805
                  Totals  13821  10000  31
 





Session #1  Session #2  Session #3  Average cost of 
reduction 
1  499260 600000 800000  882122
* 800000
^
2 499260  1000000  990000  1231594
* 995000
^
3  499260 1200000 1100000 1250000  1183333 
4  499260  900000 1000000 1200000  1033333 
5  499260 1000000 1000000 1000000  1000000 
6 499260  997496
* 990000 1090000  1040000
^
7  499260 700000  1300000 890000  963333 
8  499260 1200000 1000000 1000000  1066667 
9  499260  1330000 900000 890000  1040000 
10  499260  1200000 700000 740000  880000 
*less than 10000 units offered for sale.^ averaged only of those where 10000 units traded.   32
 




Session #1  Session #2  Session #3  Average cost of 
reduction 
1  499260 496050 564344 507338  522577 
2  499260 504043 553384 483988  513805 
3  499260 520220 498000 505141  507787 
4  499260 512132 505450 508237  508606 
5  499260 520719 526170 494911  513933 
6  499260 520719 506340 519921  515660 
7  499260 520719 516326 490442  509162 
8  499260 520719 487463 473885  494022 
9  499260 489050 493421 490442  490971 
10  499260 490045 502445 490095  494195 
   33
 Table 4. Production levels in cap and trade experiments 
Optimal: 
   p1  p2  p3  p4  p5  p6  p7  p8  p9  P10 p11 sum 
0 1 1 5 2 6 5 4 4 7 50 5 1 1 1 2 6 3 1 3 1000 1 0 0 0 0
Experimental results: 
Session #1 
   P1  p2  p3  p4  p5  p6  p7  p8  p9  p10 p11 sum 
1 594 0 558 4475 203 103 815 2266 181 0 805 10000
2 194 560 378 4475 284 103 815 2266 120 0 805 10000
3 194 834 558 4475 284 103 400 2266 81 0 805 10000
4 594 834 558 3444 284 103 815 2266 297 0 805 10000
5 285 834 558 3238 0 103 1015 3131 31 0 805 10000
6 94 834 378 4259 0 3 815 3131 481 0 5 10000
7 94 834 378 4298 0 3 1126 3131 131 0 5 10000
8 0 834 158 4475 0 3 1126 2918 481 0 5 10000
9 266 834 0 4475 0 3 1126 3131 160 0 5 10000
10 0 1079 0 4475 0 3 1126 3131 181 0 5 10000
      
S e s s i o n   # 2              
  p1  p2  p3  p4  p5  p6  p7  p8  p9  p10 p11 sum 
1 594 834 0 4438 84 103 815 2646 481 0 5 10000
2 594 834 558 4025 0 103 815 2266 0 0 805 10000
3 594 834 0 4438 284 103 815 2266 0 0 666 10000
4 563 834 0 4438 34 103 1126 2266 481 0 155 10000
5 424 834 0 4438 4 103 1126 2266 0 0 805 10000
6 0 834 0 4438 4 103 1126 2690 0 0 805 10000
7 594 834 558 4438 0 0 1105 2266 0 0 205 10000
8 594 834 0 4475 4 103 1126 2266 0 0 598 10000
9 404 834 0 4438 24 103 1126 2266 0 0 805 10000
10 594 834 0 4475 384 103 1126 2266 0 0 218 10000
 
Session #3 
  p1  p2  p3  p4  p5  p6  p7  p8  p9 p10 p11  sum 
1 594 834 558 3408 284 103 1126 2266 0 22 805 10000
2 0 1152 434 3238 0 103 815 3131 0 22 1105 10000
3 553 1152 0 3238 284 142 815 3131 0 30 655 10000
4 0 834 58 4475 0 103 1094 3131 0 0 305 10000
5 119 1152 0 4475 0 103 815 3131 0 0 205 10000
6 0 971 0 4475 0 103 815 3131 0 0 505 10000
7 446 834 0 4475 0 103 815 3122 0 0 205 10000
8 187 834 0 4475 0 142 1126 3131 0 0 105 10000
9 422 1152 0 4475 0 0 815 3131 0 0 5 10000
10 116 1152 0 4475 0 0 1126 3131 0 0 0 10000  34
Appendix A.1 Load levels for the sub-catchments of the Somerset Stanley Catchment 
    Stream order (lengths in km)                 
  Load  1  2  3  4  5  Sum  A  B (x = %)B (x=ha) $/unit Max units Target  Target cost
p1  72,564.67  39.245  23.661 28.476     91.382  73385.66 -8.21  -8.98  -5.29 -820.99  -399.398 2111.662 
  73,012.30  39.245      39.245  73385.66 -3.73  -9.51  -4.99  -373.35  -181.631 906.8764 
  73,174.76    23.661     23.661  73385.66 -2.11  -8.91  -5.33  -210.90  -102.6  546.7602 
  73,148.93     28.476    28.476  73385.66 -2.37  -8.31  -5.71  -236.73  -115.167 658.0256 
p2  72234.42  62.679  11.695 18.962 20.837   114.173 73385.66 -11.51  -10.08  -4.71 -1,151.24 -560.06  2638.318 
  72723.77  62.679      62.679  73385.66 -6.62  -10.56  -4.50  -661.89  -321.999 1448.391 
  73266.84    11.695     11.695  73385.66 -1.19  -10.16  -4.68  -118.82  -57.8042 270.249 
  73201.85     18.962    18.962  73385.66 -1.84  -9.69  -4.90  -183.80  -89.4176 438.1753 
  73198.93      20.837   20.837  73385.66 -1.87  -8.96  -5.30  -186.72  -90.8381 481.503 
p3  72614.21  39.393  15.387 30.341     85.121  73385.66 -7.71  -9.06  -5.24 -771.45  -375.299 1966.983 
  73007.52  39.393      39.393  73385.66 -3.78  -9.60  -4.95  -378.14  -183.959 910.2964 
  73247.19    15.387     15.387  73385.66 -1.38  -9.00  -5.28  -138.47  -67.3637 355.564 
  73130.82     30.341    30.341  73385.66 -2.55  -8.40  -5.66  -254.84  -123.976 701.1221 
p4  65778.72  168.947 86.472 41.351 11.178 14.958 322.906 73385.66 -76.07  -23.56  -2.02 -7,606.93 -3700.66 7461.736 
  69163.56  168.947      168.947  73385.66 -42.22  -24.99  -1.90  -4,222.10 -2053.99 3904.04 
  71343.02    86.472     86.472  73385.66 -20.43  -23.62  -2.01  -2,042.64 -993.713 1998.202 
  72474.95     41.351    41.351  73385.66 -9.11  -22.02  -2.16  -910.71  -443.046 955.5421 
  73169.67      11.178   11.178  73385.66 -2.16  -19.32  -2.46  -215.98  -105.073 258.3021 
  73170.15       14.958  14.958  73385.66 -2.16  -14.41  -3.30  -215.51  -104.842 345.6506 
p5  72969.07  16.217 25.776  6.908 7.467   56.368 73385.66 -4.17  -7.39  -6.43  -416.59 -202.663 1302.556 
  73265.8  16.217      16.217  73385.66 -1.20  -7.39  -6.43  -119.86  -58.3078 374.7437 
  73204.71    25.776     25.776  73385.66 -1.81  -7.02  -6.77  -180.95  -88.0286 595.6338 
  73339.93     6.908    6.908  73385.66 -0.46  -6.62  -7.18  -45.73  -22.2475 159.6306 
  73340.69      7.467   7.467  73385.66 -0.45  -6.02  -7.89  -44.97  -21.8773 172.548 
p6  73242.37  5.058  2.551 0.141   9.574 17.324 73385.66 -1.43  -8.27  -5.74  -143.28 -69.7056 400.3243 
  73334.49  5.058      5.058  73385.66 -0.51  -10.12  -4.70  -51.17  -24.8915 116.8806 
  73361.38    2.551     2.551  73385.66 -0.24  -9.52  -4.99  -24.28  -11.8094 58.9487 
  73384.4     0.141    0.141  73385.66 -0.01  -8.91  -5.33  -1.26  -0.61151 3.258239 
  73319.07       9.574  9.574  73385.66 -0.67  -6.95  -6.83  -66.59  -32.3927 221.2367   35
                
p7 72259.14 46.551 30.965  17.005      94.521  73385.66 -11.27  -11.92 -3.99  -1,126.51 -548.033 2184.198 
  72811.13  46.551      46.551  73385.66 -5.75  -12.34 -3.85  -574.53  -279.499  1075.704 
 73022.07    30.965        30.965  73385.66 -3.64  -11.74 -4.05  -363.59 -176.879  715.5416 
  73197.26     17.005    17.005  73385.66 -1.88  -11.08 -4.29  -188.40  -91.6544  392.9528 
p8  73357.72  3.573   0.23   3.344  7.147  73385.66 -0.28  -3.91  -12.15  -27.94  -13.5924  165.1534 
  73369.64  3.573      3.573  73385.66 -0.16  -4.48  -10.60  -16.01  -7.79058  82.56516 
  73384.72     0.23    0.23  73385.66 -0.01  -4.08  -11.65  -0.94  -0.45632  5.314858 
  73374.67       3.344  3.344  73385.66 -0.11  -3.29  -14.46  -10.99  -5.34502  77.27341 
p9 72748.42 59.498 36.238  11.312  0.071  21.357  128.476 73385.66 -6.37 -4.96 -9.58  -637.24  -310.007 2968.833 
  73073.58  59.498      59.498  73385.66 -3.12  -5.25  -9.06  -312.08  -151.822  1374.884 
 73202.83    36.238        36.238  73385.66 -1.83  -5.05  -9.41  -182.83 -88.9427  837.3905 
  73330.85     11.312    11.312  73385.66 -0.55  -4.85  -9.80  -54.81  -26.6633  261.3986 
 73385.33        0.071    0.071 73385.66 0.00  -4.62  -10.28  -0.33  -0.15957  1.640673 
  73298.47       21.357  21.357  73385.66 -0.87  -4.08  -11.63  -87.19  -42.4177  493.5192 
p10  73355.89  3.273     3.911  7.184  73385.66 -0.30  -4.14  -11.46  -29.77  -14.4807  166.0084 
  73369.74  3.273      3.273  73385.66 -0.16  -4.86  -9.76  -15.92  -7.74534  75.63273 
  73371.81       3.911  3.911  73385.66 -0.14  -3.54  -13.42  -13.84  -6.73491  90.37569 
p11  72270.12 56.535  30.083 23.513 10.703 0.141  120.975 73385.66 -11.16 -9.22  -5.15  -1,115.54  -542.695  2795.5 
  72844.75  56.535      56.535  73385.66 -5.41  -9.57  -4.96  -540.91  -263.143  1306.415 
 73108.48    30.083        30.083  73385.66 -2.77  -9.21  -5.16  -277.18 -134.844  695.1603 
  73178.42     23.513    23.513  73385.66 -2.07  -8.81  -5.39  -207.24  -100.819  543.3402 
 73298.47        10.703    10.703  73385.66 -0.87  -8.15  -5.83  -87.19  -42.4177  247.3257 
  73384.66       0.141  0.141  73385.66 -0.01  -7.05  -6.74  -0.99  -0.48357  3.258239 
 
 